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Executive Summary 
In 2005, the government announced the relocation policy of public agencies to non-
capital regions. The main purpose of the policy was to decentralize population in the SMA 
(Seoul Metropolitan Area) through building regional competitiveness. The transfer of 98% of 
the public institutions was completed in April 2017 (MOLIT 2017). However, unlike the 
blueprint for the initial plan for the relocation of the agencies, there may be an increase in 
social cost and insufficient contribution to the regional economic development. 
This study empirically examines effectiveness of the policy and its impact on regional 
economic growth and on how differently the policy affects regions depending on the distance 
from the city for relocation. To measure the policy effect, I use a Difference-in-Difference 
(DID) model.  
After analyzing the effects of the relocation of public institutions on the local 
economy through research models, there is a policy effect only on the Regional Gross 
Domestic Production (RGDP) in the target city where the innovation city is located. The 
model for analyzing the surrounding regions shows that there are not statistically significant 
effects of the policy on the real GDP and population change, indicating that the effects of 
public sector relocation policies are hardly visible in the surrounding area. As for the factors 
affecting the real GDP, the increase in the number of houses and the increase in the land price 
were found to affect the increase in the real GDP. However, analysis of the population 
change model for the target areas showed that the coefficient value of the policy effect is not 
statistically significant. This means that the public agency transfer policy has little impact on 
the population growth of the regions. 
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1. Policy Background 
In the process of industrialization and urbanization in Korea, the Seoul Metropolitan 
Area (SMA), consisting of Seoul, Incheon, and Gyeonggi-do, has been overcrowded and the 
gap between regions has been widened, which resulted in many problems such as deepening 
of regional imbalances, resentment among people in different areas of the country, and 
decline of local autonomy (Kim 2008). Within that context, the Roh Moo-hyun government, 
which began in February 2003, selected the balanced national development policy as one of 
the main tasks of the central administration.  
The concentration of government agencies in the SMA has increased the overcrowding of 
that area. One sub-policy of the government is relocation of public agencies to local areas 
with construction of the administrative city and innovation cities to avoid unnecessary 
concentration of development in the area of Seoul. This policy set up a planning period from 
2005 to 2008, a construction period for earth works from 2008 to 2013 and a period of 
relocating public agencies from 2013 to 2015. 
The relocation of public agencies and the construction of innovation cities were initiated 
to lighten the concentration of political and economic power and overcrowded population in 
the SMA (Kweon and Ryu 2007).  
 In fact, the government had been trying to transfer private enterprises, factories, and 
universities to local areas by strict regulations in the SMA in order to promote balanced 
national development (Kweon and Ryu 2007). However, there were fundamental limitations 
in pushing the private sector to move to local areas without any incentives. In 2005, 47.6% of 
the nation's population, 85% of all public institutions, and 91% of the headquarters of the 100 
largest companies were concentrated in the SMA, which was only 11.8% of the national land 
area (Committee 2005). The government believed that the concentration of public institutions 
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in the SMA promotes the concentration of private companies in the SMA and is a key factor 
in preventing the transfer of private enterprises to other provinces (Committee 2005). 
The government expected that the relocation of public institutions would contribute to 
strengthening local growth potential such as an increase of local employment and a better 
regional innovation system. The Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) 
estimated that 180 public institutions (about 32,000 employees) would transfer to local areas 
that would increase local employment up to 133,000, about 9.3 trillion won in annual 
production, and a value added inducement effect of about 4 trillion won annually (Committee 
2005). The Korean won normally fluctuates between 1000 and 1200 per US dollar.  
Particularly, relocation of research institutes and educational training institutes was supposed 
to complement the research functions of local universities and to promote regional economic 
innovation. In addition, the government also expected the relocation to contribute to an 
increase in local taxes, activation of the regional economy, expansion of opportunities for 
higher education and employment, an increase of the quality of local education and expansion 
of international exchange (Committee 2005). 
The transfer of the public institutions was close to 98% complete on April 2017(MOLIT 
2017). However, unlike the blueprint of the initial plan for the relocation of the agencies, the 
plan has some problems such as an increase in social cost and insufficient contribution to the 
regional economic development. For example, the migration rate of agency staffs without 
their family members was more than 70%, which resulted into an enormous increase in social 
costs (Byeon 2016). Moreover, a Doughnut Phenomenon of the old city center has occurred 
due to the influx of the city center population into the newly built high-grade residential area 
in innovation cities (Cho 2016). These problems are raising serious concerns that innovation 
cities may fail. 
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Table 1. Description of Innovation city projects 
Province 
Or  
Metro-city   
developed 
Areas(a)  
(km2) 
construction 
cost(b) 
(billion won)  
# of 
agencies(c)  
# of 
employees(d)  
# of 
apartment(e)  
Total local 
tax(f) 
(billion won)  
Busan  9.35 414 13 3,274 2,304 438 
Chungbuk  6.899 989 11 3,085 12,614 38 
Daegu  4.216 1,437 11 3,451 6,843 72 
Gangwon  3.596 884 12 5,843 7,477 68 
Gyeongbuk  3.12 877 12 5,452 9,281 55 
Gyeongnam  4.93 971 11 3,767 8,057 77 
Jeju  1.135 292 8 771 1,741 12 
Jeonbuk  9.852 1,530 12 4,927 8,740 94 
Jeonnam  7.361 1,322 16 6,812 14,939 128 
Ulsan  2.99 1,044 9 3,166 6,044 50 
Sum  45 9,760 115 40,548 78,040 1,033 
Data Source: (a)(b)(c)(d)(e)-(MOLIT, 2017) , (f)- (Byeon, 2016) 
Note 
- (b): The construction cost includes the earth work but not includes building costs 
- (f): total local taxes paid by the relocated agencies from 2013 to 2015 
 
 
The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze the impact of regional transfer of 
public institutions on regional economic development and population development. In 
particular, I will analyze how innovation cities have affected local economic development 
and population growth in the surrounding small and medium cities, and examine factors 
influencing regional economic growth and population growth 
 
2. Importance of this research 
This research has several differences to prior research from three perspectives. First, 
there is no empirical analysis on the impact of the relocation policy that uses quantitative 
research methods. Second, the unit of analysis of the paper is the smallest administrative level 
of city. Most research has been organized at the level of province and metro-city. Lastly, this 
paper compares impacts of the policy on regions for relocation and their neighboring regions.  
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3. Literature Review 
Functions and effects of relocation of public agencies 
Cases for local relocation of the public institutions have been found in many developed 
countries. This policy has mainly been attempted to curb population concentration and to 
promote balanced regional development. In the case of the United Kingdom, a total of 4,900 
people were relocated by 1988 to resolve overcrowding of London's population and to tackle 
the financial deficit (Bae 2005). To restrain the population concentration of Paris as well as to 
develop the underdeveloped areas in France, the French government transferred 23,000 
public employees before 1990, and thereafter 279 organizations and 30,000 people to the 
provinces. In the case of Japan, 40 national institutions and 19 public agencies were relocated 
for resolution of population concentration in Tokyo and decentralized national territory 
development (Lee 2015). 
The transfer of public institutions in Korea was expected to have similar effects to that of 
overseas cases (transfer of employment to local regions, regional industrial structure 
improvement effect). According to the KRIHS in 2005, the transfer of 176 public institutions 
to local areas would lead to the transfer of 130,000 jobs directly or indirectly related to the 
institutions from the Seoul metropolitan area to other areas. It would result in 9.3 trillion won 
of the local production increase and 4 trillion won of the value-added inducement effect 
(Committee 2005). In addition, it was expected that the public-sector employment recognized 
as high intelligence jobs is expected to have an impact on improvement of local education 
conditions. It would also be expected that development of specialized regional industries 
linked with characteristics of public institutions would lead to reform of local industrial 
structure (Lee 2015). Above all things, the ultimately prospective effects of the relocation 
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policy can be summarized as 'decentralization of overcrowding population of the 
metropolitan area' and 'enhancing regional competitiveness' (Committee 2005). 
 
Previous research on impact of the relocation policy on local economies 
Previous research on ripple effects of the transfer of public institutions in Korea has 
mainly been carried out from two perspectives. The first is an analysis of impacts on 
population and housing. The study on population and housing sector mainly estimated 
population migration from the Seoul metropolitan area by year. The most recent study, Kim 
et al. (2013), analyzed the ripple effect on Gyeong-gi Province employment, population, and 
income (RGDP) of the transfer of public institutions by using vector autoregressive model 
and a spatial econometric model. The second is an impact analysis on industrial and 
economic sectors. Most research has estimated economic ripple effects assuming the transfer 
of public institutions. The KRIHS also analyzed economic effects of construction of 
innovation cities, operating effects of public agencies and effects of local tax increases. The 
analytical method is based on the inter-regional input-output table released by the Bank of 
Korea in 2005 and estimated the ripple effect at the country and provincial level (Kim 2014). 
This previous research has limitations that they are not based on empirical analysis and the 
unit of analysis is spatially too broad to measure the effect.  
 
Local population growth as a measurement 
Portnov and Etzion (2000) analyzed the impact of population decentralization policy 
in Israel on regional economic growth. The paper divided six administrative areas into two 
contrasting groups (core and periphery) to measure policy effectiveness. In the analysis 
structure, the annual growth rate of population was included as a dependent variable, and the 
public construction and infrastructure were set as a policy measurement to estimate intensity 
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of the policy. In order to control the population growth rate, the quantitative analysis included 
the annual changes in the real GDP as an economic performance of the nation, and the annual 
number of foreign immigrants and the unemployment change (Portnov and Etzion 2000). The 
results showed that population growth in the peripheral regions have been stimulated mainly 
by immigration and public construction. On the other hand, in the core districts of the country, 
both immigration and unemployment change were the main factors affecting the population 
growth rate (Portnov and Etzion 2000). 
 
Regional economic growth as a measurement  
It is difficult to find an empirical study on impact of the relocation policy even though 
the regional transfer has just reached over 95 percent (MOLIT 2017). At the same time, it is 
also hard to find an empirical analysis of the relationship among new town development and 
local economic and population growth. To overcome this, I looked for examples of impacts 
of Social Overhead Capital (SOC) on the local economy. The construction of the innovation 
city through the transfer of the public institutions to local areas can be regarded as a large-
scale investment of public capital and the installation of large-scale infrastructure including 
highway, provincial roads, urban planning roads, apartments, and city parks.  
In particular, studies analyzing the correlation between transportation infrastructure 
and regional economic growth show that transportation infrastructure has a positive impact 
on the overall growth of the regional economy by improving mobility of population, logistics 
and information. For example, one study revealed that all transportation infrastructure affects 
the local economy positively, and that road facilities are more effective in local economies 
than railways, ports and airport facilities (Lee and Kim 2012). They used the Cobb-Douglas 
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production function model with panel data of GDP, private capital, labor and transportation 
infrastructure capital stock of ten province level regions from 1993 to 2007 (Lee and Kim 2012).  
The other study estimated impacts of the Korea Train Express (KTX) station on the local 
economy and regional balanced development (Jo and Woo 2014). They considered GDP as a 
dependent variable, the population size (demographic change), economic factors (airport, 
seaport, urban railway, changes of the amount of paved roads) and public factors (change in 
financial independence of the local government). In addition, the paper added value of 
distance to the nearest stations, the number of users per unit of distance, and individual 
stations as the explanatory variables to measure the influence of the KTX stations. The 
analysis showed that the number of employees, amount of paved roads, and financial 
independence have statistically significant effects (Jo and Woo 2014). 
4. Research Methodology  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
To estimate the policy impact, I would like to answer two questions. One is how the 
relocation policy affects local population and promotion of the local economy. The other is 
how differently the policy has affected on the local areas depending on distance to the 
innovation city. To answer these questions, I set up three hypotheses. First, the relocation 
policy increase local real GDP and population in the target areas which innovation cities are 
located. Second, the policy has a positive impact on real GDP growth in the surrounding area. 
Third, the policy has a negative impact on population growth in the surrounding areas. 
 
Research Model 
To test the hypotheses, I use the Difference-in-Difference (DID) approach. The DID is a 
popular research design for estimating causal effects of policy changes and certain policy 
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interventions (Athey and Imbens 2006, Lechner 2011). The model can be established when 
outcomes are measured for two groups for two times or more periods. As shown below the 
Table 2, the treated group is exposed to the policy in the second period, but not in the first 
period. The other control group is not affected by the policy during any time periods.  
 
Table 2. The Difference-in-Difference estimator (Model 1) 
  Before-Policy Post-Policy Difference 
Group 1 (Treat) Yt1 Yt2 ΔYt = Yt2-Yt1 
Group 2 (Control) Yc1 Yc2 ΔYc=Yc2-Yc1 
Difference   ΔΔY=ΔYt – ΔYc 
Source : (Yi 2016) 
 
As stated above, I would like to measure impacts of the policy on both target areas where 
the public agencies move and their surrounding regions (SR region) including the target areas. 
Therefore, I set up the treatment group two different ways. To estimate impacts of the policy 
on the target cities which the public agencies moved, the treatment group was established 
with 12 cities for relocation of the public agencies and the control group was set up with the 
other 149 cities. To measure the impact on the SR, the treatment group was set up with 44 
cities and the control group was built with 117 cities. At the same time, I establish the post time 
period from 2010 because building construction in the innovation cities was started from 2010.  
 
Figure 1. The typical DID estimator in a regression framework 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀 
✓ 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the outcome of Region i and year t 
✓ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a dummy if the observation is in the treatment group 
✓ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy if the observation is in the post period 
✓ (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑖𝑡 is a dummy if the observation is both in the treatment and post period 
✓ Control: other independent variables which affect the outcome 
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To estimate the DID estimator in a regression framework, the typical regression model is 
set as the above Figure 1.  
The unit of analysis is a municipal city of the smallest unit of the administrative city. 
Observations for the analysis are 161 local cities out of a total of 226 local cities in Korea 
from 2006 to 2014.  Due to limitation of available data, especially real GDP, the scope of 
the observation was limited to seven provinces and six metropolitan cities except the Capital 
Regions and Je-Ju Island.   
Since the goal of this paper is to measure the impact of the relocation policy on local 
economic growth and population growth, I established two dependent variables, real GDP, 
which is generally well-known as measurement of economic growth, and population. The 
data is changed into the annual increase rate.  
Table 3. Summary of dependent and independent variables 
Classification variables Unit 
Dependent Variables 
 
Model Ⅰ Changes in real GDP ratio 
 
Model Ⅱ Changes in Population ratio 
Independent variables 
 
policy effect 
Treat (treatment group) dummy 
Post (post period after 2009) dummy 
Policy effect (Treat * Post period) dummy 
economic factors 
Changes in real GDP (Model Ⅱ) ratio 
employees/1000 Units 
companies/1000 Units 
Population factor 
Changes in Population  ratio 
Birthrate ratio 
Infrastructural factor 
Amount of new housing /1000 unit 
Changes of land prices ratio 
Public Factors Changes of financial independence  ratio 
Note: The real GDP at the 2010 current price was derived from the nominal GDP by using the 
GDP deflator of the country. 
Source: the Statistics Korea, a central organization for statistics under the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance: http://www.kosis.kr. 
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The independent variables are categorized into four sets which influence local economic 
growth. First, changes in the real GDP, for which changes in employees and companies 
represent economic characteristics. The number of companies and employees directly affect 
the regional GDP growth rate. The more companies and employees, the larger amount of 
output is produced. Lee and Kim (2012) stated that an increase in companies and employees 
promoted local economy growth.  
The second one is the rate of increase of population and the annual birth rate. Population 
growth is the most fundamental factor for urban growth. The increase in population has a 
significant impact on the regional economic growth due to consumption activity as well as 
the increase in the labor force (Jo and Woo 2014). Meanwhile, the birth rates were inserted to 
control for the natural increases in population growth. Seol (2015) analyzed the effects of 
demographic changes, with structural changes in economically active populations, elderly 
population, and the birth rate, on the local economy (Seol 2015).  
Third, as a characteristic of infrastructure, amount of newly constructed housing and 
changes of land prices were set up. Much research uses public construction including roads, 
utilities and public housing, which highly influences local economic growth (Portnov and 
Etzion 2000, Lee and Kim 2012, Jo and Woo 2014). Especially, the public housing 
construction accompanies construction of other infrastructure such as road, water supply 
facilities, sewage treatment and other fundamental infrastructure. Moreover, to control effects 
of other infrastructure, land price is set up as an independent variable because accessibility of 
basic infrastructure such as roads, transport and public parks, increase land value (Du and 
Mulley 2006).  
Lastly, the public factor is represented by change of the public financial self-
independence. The self-independence is the assessment of local autonomous financial 
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management capability. In the study of factors influencing the regional economic growth, the 
increase of the local finance independence promotes regional economic growth (Gang 2008).  
 
5. Results and findings  
Descriptive statistics 
This paper categorizes the statistics into two groups. One group is divided into the target 
regions and non-target regions as shown in Table 4. The other group consists of the SR and 
the other regions as shown in Table 5.  
Table 4. Summary of dependent and independent variables (Target - Non Target Regions) 
Target Regions (12 cities) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PC_RGDP 112 0.039  0.095  -0.284  0.360  
PC_POP 120 0.005  0.028  -0.030  0.211  
N_New_APT_1000 120 1.84  2.88  0.00  20.83  
PC_Land_Price 120 2.26  3.44  -3.76  27.71  
Birth_Rate 120 1.26  0.21  0.88  1.72  
Self_independence 120 27.19  6.81  10.90  50.60  
Employees/1000 120 321.80  111.74  170.25  664.24  
Companies/1000 120 65.90  9.51  48.00  89.45  
Non-Target Regions (149 cities) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PC_RGDP 1,386 0.027  0.084  -0.542  0.339  
PC_POP 1,490 -0.004  0.018  -0.101  0.110  
N_New_APT_1000 1,490 0.89  1.80  0.00  15.36  
PC_Land_Price 1,490 1.27  1.62  -3.72  17.73  
Birth_Rate 1,490 1.35  0.27  0.70  2.47  
Self_independence 1,490 20.55  10.35  6.40  57.90  
Employees/1000 1,490 329.91  152.61  139.88  1,497.72  
Companies/1000 1,490 74.87  28.37  38.44  322.19  
  
Table 5. Summary of dependent and independent variables (SR-Non SR regions)  
SR (44 cities) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PC_RGDP 412 0.034  0.082  -0.339  0.339  
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PC_POP 440 0.002  0.021  -0.057  0.110  
N_New_APT_1000 440 1.22  2.06  0.00  14.10  
PC_Land_Price 440 1.46  1.81  -2.37  17.73  
Birth_Rate 440 1.32  0.28  0.72  2.19  
Self_independence 440 23.11  10.72  6.90  57.90  
Employees/1000 440 344.87  142.87  160.08  1,159.36  
Companies/1000 440 72.72  31.81  38.44  272.49  
Non-SR (117 cities) 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
PC_RGDP 1,086 0.025  0.086  -0.542  0.360  
PC_POP 1,170 -0.005  0.018  -0.101  0.211  
N_New_APT_1000 1,170 0.87  1.86  0.00  20.83  
PC_Land_Price 1,170 1.30  1.84  -3.76  27.71  
Birth_Rate 1,170 1.35  0.26  0.70  2.47  
Self_independence 1,170 20.27  10.00  6.40  53.90  
Employees/1000 1,170 323.45  152.16  139.88  1,497.72  
Companies/1000 1,170 74.75  25.70  42.97  322.19  
 
Interestingly, in the first group, the average increase ratios of the real GDP and 
population in the target regions are slightly greater than those in the non-target regions. The 
increase ratios of the real GDP and population in the SR are also greater than those in the 
non-SR. Moreover, the other indicators, including the number of new apartments, changes in 
land price, self-independence ratio and number of employees per 1000 people, show better 
figures in both the target and SR regions than non-target and non-SR regions. 
 
Trend of real GDP and Population 
The key assumption for the DID approach is that the outcomes in treated and controlled 
groups should follow the similar time trend in the absence of the intervention (Lechner 2011). 
However, the outcomes do not need to have the same mean. It is difficult for this assumption 
to be verified, but pre-treatment data are used to show there are the same time trends (Athey 
and Imbens 2006). If the outcomes show a different trend, the estimator of the DID model 
will under-estimate or over-estimate the treatment effects (Lechner 2011). Therefore, it is 
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necessary to verify whether the real GDP and population have the same time trends before 
the policy intervention. Figure 2 shows that the population in target regions has a similar 
trend but real GDP has a slightly different trend during 2009. Meanwhile, as shown in Figure 
3, the real GDP shows a similar trend but the population shows quite a different trend.  
 
Figure 2. The year trend of each region (Target regions) 
  
 
Figure 3. The year trend of each region (SR regions) 
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The common trend can be testified by a regression model. Without policy impact, as the 
treatment group shows the same trend, we can set up the regression model as below (Yi 
2016). If 𝛽2 is equal to 0, the treatment group has the same time trend with the control group.  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜀 
✓ 𝑌𝑖 is the outcome of Region i  
✓ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 is a dummy if the observation is in the treatment group 
✓ Control: other independent variables which control the outcome 
 
Table 6. Results of the OLS regression analysis to test for common trends in the innovation city 
PC_RGDP Coef. t 
 
PC_POP Coef. T 
Region_I (Treat) -0.02201  -1.73  Region_I(Treat) -0.00095  -0.56 
PC_POP -0.07025  -0.28  PC_ RGDP -0.00205  -0.28 
N_New_1000 0.00150  0.74  N_New_1000 0.00087  2.32 
PC_Land_Price 0.00304  2.28  PC_Land_Price 0.00034  1.74 
Birth_Rate 0.04021  2.86  Birth_Rate 0.01837  7.22 
Self_independence 0.00032  0.60  Self_independence 0.00088  9.78 
Employees/1000 0.00005  1.12  Employees/1000 0.00002  1.42 
Companies/1000 -0.00013  -0.67  Companies/1000 -0.00014  -2.36 
constant -0.04753  -1.83  constant -0.04474  -10.49 
 
Table 7. Results of the OLS regression analysis to test for common trends regions 
surrounding the innovation city, including it 
 
PC_RGDP Coef. t 
 
PC_POP Coef. T 
Region_I_N(Treat) 0.01684  2.24  Region_I_N(Treat) 0.00708  4.81 
PC_POP -0.16694  -0.66  PC_ RGDP -0.00467  -0.65 
N_New_1000 0.00145  0.72  N_New_1000 0.00083  2.32 
C_Land_Price 0.00284  2.09  C_Land_Price 0.00035  1.87 
Birth_Rate 0.04653  3.21  Birth_Rate 0.01967  7.68 
Self_independence 0.00034  0.66  Self_independence 0.00087  9.97 
Employees/1000 0.00004  0.81  Employees/1000 0.00001  1.04 
Companies/1000 -0.00005  -0.23  Companies/1000 -0.00011  -1.89 
constant -0.06510  -2.37  constant -0.04892  -11.49 
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Table 6 and Table 7 show results of the OLS regression analysis testing the trend. The 
coefficient of target regions is not statistically significant, so it can be said that there is no 
evidence to reject that target areas have the same time trend in the absence of the policy. 
However, the coefficient of SR is statistically significant. Therefore, it cannot be said that the 
SR regions have the same time trend with the other regions.  
 
Checking Multicollinearity 
There are several ways to check the multicollinearity in the analysis. In this paper, I use 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in Stata. As “a rule of thumb”, if the value of the VIF 
exceeds ten, there is a multicollinearity problem (Williams 2011). Table 9 shows that all 
values of the VIF are lower than five, so that there is no multicollinearity problem.  
 
Table 8. Results of the VIF test 
RGDP (target regions) 
  
POP (target regions) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Employees/1000 4.65 0.215004 Employees/1000 4.7 0.212822 
Companies/1000 4.22 0.237185 Companies/1000 4.27 0.234429 
T10_R_I 2.26 0.443348 Self_independence 2.11 0.474321 
Region_I 2.23 0.448844 T10_R_I_N 2.05 0.487132 
Self_independence 2.11 0.473435 pc_pop 1.69 0.592224 
PC_POP 1.67 0.600013 Regio_I_N 1.63 0.61224 
N_New_APT/1000 1.44 0.69294 T_10 1.54 0.650346 
Birth_Rate 1.31 0.763879 N_New_APT/1000 1.44 0.692808 
T_10 1.18 0.850114 Birth_Rate 1.32 0.758339 
C_Land_Price 1.08 0.926718 C_Land_Price 1.06 0.94017 
Mean VIF 2.21 
 
Mean VIF 2.18 
 RGDP (SR regions) 
  
POP (SR regions) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Employees/1000 4.56 0.219074 Employees/1000 4.63 0.216116 
Companies/1000 4.12 0.242546 Companies/1000 4.19 0.238871 
T10_R_I 2.27 0.44105 T10_R_I_N 2.05 0.486908 
Region_I 2.23 0.447781 Self_independence 1.95 0.511539 
Self_independence 1.96 0.509573 Regio_I_N 1.62 0.618914 
N_New_APT/1000 1.34 0.746537 T_10 1.52 0.658114 
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Birth_Rate 1.24 0.80767 N_New_APT/1000 1.34 0.74713 
T_10 1.16 0.860576 Birth_Rate 1.24 0.804697 
C_Land_Price 1.08 0.927092 C_Land_Price 1.06 0.941156 
PC_RGDP 1.03 0.967681 
 
PC_RGDP 1.03 0.973806 
Mean VIF 2.1 
  
Mean VIF 2.06 
  
Results of the Regression analysis 
The main purpose of the analysis is to measure the effectiveness of the relocation policy 
with the measurement of the real GDP and population. The result of the model for the target 
areas shows that the coefficient value of the policy effect is statistically significant and 
positive. This implies that the change in the real GDP of the city where the innovation city is 
located is higher than that of the other cities after the implementation of the relocation policy. 
Infrastructure factors such as the land price change and increase in apartment are statistically 
significant, both of which have positive values, indicating that they act as factors for 
increasing the real GDP.  
 
Table 9. Results of the robust OLS regression analysis for target regions 
Model Ⅰ 
PC_RGDP  
Coef. t 
 
Model Ⅱ 
PC_POP 
Coef. t 
T10_R_I 
(Policy Effect) 
0.05405  3.24 *** 
T10_R_I 
(Policy Effect) 
0.00496  1.35 
 
Region_I (Treat) -0.02354  -1.87 * Region_I (Treat) -0.00085  -0.46 
 
T_10 (Post) 0.00584  1.21 
 
T_10 (Post) 0.00365  4.47 *** 
C_Land_Price 0.00246  1.96 *** PC_RGDP 0.00807  1.34 
 
N_New_APT/1000 0.00267  1.75 * C_Land_Price 0.00046  2.19 ** 
PC_POP 0.26234  1.37 
 
N_New_APT/1000 0.00252  3.26 *** 
Birth_Rate 0.01539  1.61 
 
Birth_Rate 0.01480  9.49 *** 
Self_independence 0.00000  -0.01 
 
Self_independence 0.00056  5.7 *** 
Employees/1000 0.00003  0.74 
 
Employees/1000 0.00003  3.27 *** 
Companies/1000 -0.00012  -0.74 
 
Companies/1000 -0.00017  -4.35 *** 
constant -0.00119  -0.07 
 
constant -0.03663  -12.51 *** 
Note: ***: P<0.01, **: 0.01<P<0.05, *: 0.05<P<0.1 
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On the other hand, the analysis of the population change model for the target areas 
showed that the policy effect is not statistically significant. There is no evidence to reject the 
hypothesis that the public agency transfer policy has little impact on the population growth of 
the region. In fact, the transfer of public institutions began in 2013 and exceeded 90% in 2016. 
In addition, the increase in land prices, the increase in the number of apartments, the increase 
in financial self-reliance, and the increase in the number of employees show a statistically 
significant positive relationship with population growth. The interesting thing is that the 
coefficient value of the real GDP is not statistically significant. There is no evidence to reject 
the hypothesis that real GDP has no impacts on the population. 
 
Table 10. Results of the robust OLS regression analysis for SR regions 
PC_RGDP Coef. T 
 
PC_POP Coef. t 
T10_R_I_N 
(Policy Effect) 
0.00675  0.86 
 
T10_R_I_N 
(Policy Effect) 
-0.00026  -0.15 
 
Region_I_N(Treat) 0.00196  0.31 
 
Region_I_N(Treat) 0.00433  2.98 *** 
T_10 (Post) 0.00754  1.35 
 
T_10 (Post) 0.00413  5.02 *** 
C_Land_Price 0.00223  1.74 * PC_RGDP 0.00813  1.3 
 
N_New_APT/1000 0.00270  1.72 * C_Land_Price 0.00047  2.33 ** 
PC_POP 0.26965  1.35 
 
N_New_APT/1000 0.00252  3.12 *** 
Birth_Rate 0.01528  1.55 
 
Birth_Rate 0.01519  9.5 *** 
Self_independence 0.00000  -0.01 
 
Self_independence 0.00056  5.76 *** 
Employees/1000 0.00002  0.64 
 
Employees/1000 0.00003  2.87 *** 
Companies/1000 -0.00011  -0.64 
 
Companies/1000 -0.00015  -3.92 *** 
constant -0.00298  -0.16 
 
constant -0.03860  -12.66 *** 
Note : ***: P<0.01, **: 0.01<P<0.05, *: 0.05<P<0.1 
Table 10 shows results of the analysis of the real GDP and population growth in the SR. 
As a result of the analysis, the policy effect is statistically insignificant. This means that there 
is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the relocation policy has no effect on the 
surrounding area. In the case of the population growth model, the policy effect is also not 
statistically significant.  
22 
 
 
Finding 
As a result of analyzing the effects, there is a policy effect only on the real GDP in the 
target city. Meanwhile, the model for analyzing the SR shows that there are not statistically 
significant effects of the policy on the real GDP and population change, indicating that the 
effects of public sector relocation policies are hardly visible in the surrounding areas. If we 
look at this in connection with infrastructure factors, the increase in land price and the 
increase in the number of houses have a positive relationship with the increase in real GDP 
within the region and it is statistically significant. This means that the price of land in the 
target area is much higher than in other areas, and more apartments have been built in the 
target area. However, the analysis of the population change model for the target areas shows 
that the coefficient value of the policy effect is not statistically significant. It means that the 
public agency transfer policy has little impact on the population growth of the region. 
 
Table 11. Households and population that moved into innovation cities 
Province 
 
move in within the region outside of the region 
Chungbuk 
# of 
Households 2264 1348 60% 916 40% 
  population 5819 3648 63% 2171 37% 
Gwangju-
Jeonnam 
# of 
Households 3390 1789 53% 1601 47% 
 
population 8396 4973 59% 3423 41% 
Gyeongbuk 
# of 
Households 1662 1054 63% 608 37% 
  population 4576 3299 72% 1277 28% 
Gyeongnam 
# of 
Households 2258 1898 84% 360 16% 
 
population 6870 5870 85% 1000 15% 
Source: Kwon, 2015 
 
In particular, results of the statistically insignificant policy effect on the population 
both in the target area and the SR have important meaning. Apartments and other facilities 
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built for the transfer of public institutions did not absorb population of other provinces or the 
capital region the local and nearby population. The Regional Development Committee under 
the Presidential Office, as shown in Table 11, reported that more than 60% of the population 
in the innovation cities moved within the region. In other words, the city rapidly absorbs the 
population from the surrounding areas (Kwon 2015). In addition, according to the survey 
conducted by the KRIHS in 2015, as stated above Figure 4, only 28.6% of agencies’ 
employees (26,182 people) moved to the local areas with their families. Insufficient living 
environment, education and cultural conditions compared to the capital region had them 
hesitate to move to the region in the absence of attractive incentives (Kwon 2015, Byeon 
2016). In particular, the migration ratio was lower in smaller innovation cities than that in big 
cities due to the unsatisfactory living situation (Cho 2016).  
 
Figure 4. Migration Ratio of Employees with their Families (%)  
 
 
Data Source: Kwon, 2015 
 
 
Absorbing population from local and nearby cities produces a variety of problems, 
such as the Doughnut Effect in the existing city center. The Doughnut Effect occurs when a 
large-scale new city, which is located adjacent to the old city town, absorbs population and 
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commerce functions of the city center (Takata, Hayashi et al. 2014). For example, as of 2015, 
the official land prices of the innovation city in Jinju have risen by an average of 8% over the 
previous year, while the land prices in the old town center have decreased by 1 to 2% (Seo 
2015). This phenomenon produces a decline of existing urban areas and increases social costs, 
thus negatively affecting regional economic growth. 
 
6. Public Policy Implication 
Since the beginning stage of the policy in 2005, the government has expected relocation 
of the agency to strengthen local economic growth. However, the analysis shows that the 
policy has only impacted on the increase in the real GDP but not on the population in the 
target areas. This means that there are physical effects by the construction of the innovation 
cities, but it failed to increase population. Until now, the government action has been devoted 
to the physical construction including apartments, office buildings and other basic 
infrastructures for public institutions and employees. Therefore, the province or local 
government should focus on more specific goals, such as reinforcing regional innovation and 
balanced development of the local areas.  
The provincial or local government needs to change sub-systems of the local economy 
by building regional innovation systems. According to Carillo-Hermosilla et al., there are 
three factors in the processes of environmental innovation: component changes, sub-system 
changes and system changes (Carrillo-Hermosilla, del Río et al. 2010). The central 
government has changed the components of the local economic structure. The next step 
should be followed by the action from local government. The system theory addresses the 
importance of collective learning and relationships among participants of the system 
(Moulaert and Sekia 2003). Mostly technological innovation comes from collaboration 
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between local universities and business associations, especially in the sites of new rising 
industries such as Silicon Valley, Cambridge and Boston (Benneworth 2006). The relocated 
public agencies can play a key role as a bridge for collaboration because they are able to 
cooperate with both the government and the private.   
 
Moreover, the other goal is to promote the balanced development between the old town 
and the new town in the local. It can be achieved by constructing regional infrastructure 
through distribution of the local taxes derived from the public agencies. The rapid decline of 
the urban function in the local area may cause security problems, and insufficient utilization 
of public facilities and infrastructure which result in excessive social cost. Especially, the 
Doughnut Phenomenon induces continuous spread of urban outskirts, causing energy, 
transportation and environmental problems, and leaving the city with an overall economic 
burden (Kim 2007). Investment in urban infrastructure is considered as a way of raising the 
competitiveness of the urban region by improving public transport networks and surrounding 
residential environments (de Magalhães 2015). 
 
7. Limitation 
Limitation in Data collection 
This study uses the data from the municipal level. This point is different from the 
previous research on the topic. However, at the same time, there is a limitation to collect clear 
data for the analysis. Most local governments at the municipal level reported the statistics 
only since 2005.  The data from 2005 was not enough to estimate the time trend in the 
absence of the policy.  
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Limitation in Time period for the analysis 
As mentioned before, the relocation of the public agencies reached 98% in April 2017. 
However, the time period of this analysis is limited within 2014 due to lack of data 
availability, such as the real GDP. In order to see the effects of the policy on the local areas, 
as the Regional Development Committee expects that the effects of the relocation will be 
diffused after 2020, the analysis to measure impact of the policy needs more time periods.  
 
Limitation in the Research Model and Recommendation 
My second research question is how the policy has affected the local areas differently, 
depending on the distance to the innovation city. Moreover, economic growth factors such as 
real GDP and population growth rate are recognized as they are affected by the neighboring 
regions depending on distance. The spatial analysis is very effective when there is spatial 
autocorrelation in units of analysis. It is especially useful when the dynamics of one local 
economy affect development of neighboring local economies through market relationships 
and trade linkage (Capello 2009, LeSage and Pace 2009, Choi 2017) . 
 
8. Conclusion  
The policy of local public transfer was carried out in order to distribute economic power 
concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitan area to the provinces and to bring about balanced 
development to the whole country. To this end, it aims at promoting regional economic and 
population growth by constructing innovation cities and dispersing public institutions. It has 
been criticized for its lack of success in bringing about regional innovation and lack of 
effectiveness by distributing the public institutions in too many cities. In this study, the 
analysis empirically measures the effect of the transfer policy on regional economic growth. 
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The regression analysis shows that the policy effect is only for the real GDP in the target city 
where the innovation city is located. Meanwhile, the model for the surrounding regions 
shows that there is no significant effect on the real GDP change and population change, 
suggesting that the effects of the public sector local transfer policies are hardly visible in the 
surrounding area. 
The results of this study are as follows. First, housing built for the relocation of public 
institutions failed to attract population from the other regions. The innovation city has 
absorbed the population from the local city and its surrounding region. This causes problems 
such as the Doughnut Effect of the existing old town and increasing social costs due to 
insufficient use of the existing infrastructure. Second, the effect of the relocation policy has 
not been shown yet and needs data from more time periods. This is because public 
institutions started to move four years ago. Therefore, to maximize the effects of the transfer 
of public institutions and to promote regional economic growth, local governments need to 
focus on beyond physical development. To do this, they need to strengthen the regional 
innovation system and promote the balanced development between the old and new towns.  
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Appendix A. Results of innovation city construction 
 
Table A-1. Estimated Expenditure for Earth Work Construction of innovation cities 
 
 
Table 2. The number of apartments built in innovation cities (units) 
 
 
(million won)
Construction cost 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sum
Busan 12,408         16,544         12,408         -                 -                 -                 41,360         
Chungbuk 9,890           19,780         19,780         19,780         19,780         9,890           98,900         
Daegu 14,369         28,738         28,738         28,738         28,738         14,369         143,690        
Gangwon 8,843           17,686         17,686         17,686         17,686         8,843           88,430         
Gyeongbuk 8,774           17,548         17,548         17,548         17,548         8,774           87,740         
Gyeongnam 9,711           19,422         19,422         19,422         19,422         9,711           97,110         
Jeju 2,921           5,842           5,842           5,842           5,842           2,921           29,210         
Jeonbuk 15,297         30,594         30,594         30,594         30,594         15,297         152,970        
Jeonnam 13,222         26,444         26,444         26,444         26,444         13,222         132,220        
Ulsan 10,438         20,876         20,876         20,876         20,876         10,438         104,380        
Sum 105,873       203,474       199,338       186,930       186,930       93,465         976,010       
Num of Apartment 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Sum
Busan 2,304        -          -          -          -          -          2,304    
Chungbuk -               1,110    1,150    1,278    691      8,385    12,614  
Daegu -               350      446      2,423    1,712    1,912    6,843    
Gangwon -               1,110    1,180    2,537    2,232    418      7,477    
Gyeongbuk -               660      1,913    2,226    3,714    768      9,281    
Gyeongnam -               1,779    600      2,223    630      2,825    8,057    
Jeju -               -          477      548      716      -          1,741    
Jeonbuk -               4,134    2,482    552      1,572    -          8,740    
Jeonnam -               1,226    1,948    2,898    5,468    3,399    14,939  
Ulsan -               1,697    3,923    424      -          -          6,044    
Sum 2,304        12,066  14,119  15,109  16,735  17,707  78,040  
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Table 3. Local taxes by the public agencies relocated (billion won) 
 
 
 
Local Tax 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Sum
Busan -            0            14          18          406        438        
Chungbuk -            1            2            10          25          38          
Daegu -            4            8            22          38          72          
Gangwon -            0            4            15          49          68          
Gyeongbuk -            3            6            14          32          55          
Gyeongnam 2            6            22          47          -            77          
Jeju -            1            1            2            8            12          
Jeonbuk -            7            8            50          30          94          
Jeonnam -            5            2            36          85          128        
Ulsan -            0            4            23          23          50          
Sum 2            26          70          238        697        1,033      
